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THE DELAY RENTAL AND RELATED CLAUSES OF OIL
AND GAS LEASES*
HowVARD R. VILLIAMS-'*
The typical modern oil and gas lease provides for a relatively
short primary term of five or ten years and contains a "thereafter"
clause by virtue of which theoretically the interest of the lessee may
have a potentially perpetual duration. Under this habendum or
granting clause the lessee's interest may last forever, but it will ter-
minate on failure of production at or after the expiration of the pri-
mary term. The interest of the lessee generally is labeled an interest
in fee simple determinable, that is, a fee subject to a special
limitation. Categorizing the interest has caused some difficulty in
certain states where the lessee's interest may be denominated a term
of years during the primary term. But if the lease survives the pri-
mary term, then clearly his interest has a potentially indefinite
duration (a fee), but is subject to termination upon the happening
of some event (in this case, the cessation of production) ; the lessee
has, in other words, a fee on a special limitation.
THE HABENDUM CLAUSE
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the habendum
clause of the lease in any great detail, but by reason of the interrela-
tion of this clause with the delay rental clause, it is appropriate and
necessary to mention briefly certain of the doctrines which have
developed with reference to this clause of the lease.
1. With virtual unanimity the courts have declared that the
lessee's interest ends automatically with the expiration of the pri-
mary term unless the event or one of the events specifically men-
tioned in the "thereafter" clause has occurred, and it terminates
*This paper was delivered at an Institute of the State Bar Association
of North Dakota, Bismarck, North Dakota, October 29-31, 1953.
*-Professor of Law, Columbia University.
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thereafter on subsequent failure of production.' Neither notice by
the lessor to the lessee of the termination nor re-entry by the lessor
is necessary. 2 The termination, being automatic, cannot be waived
by a lessor who seeks to recover damages for alleged subsequent
breach of the lessee's obligations under the lease. 3 If the lessee con-
tinues in possession of the land after the automatic termination of
the lease, his possession may be categorized as that of a tenant from
month to month, at sufferance, or at will.4 Since his original entry
upon the land was by right, he does not become a trespasser, or at
least not a "bad faith" trespasser, by holding over until he is directed
and refuses to surrender possession.5
2. The termination of the lessee's original interest in the land
is by virtue of the normal expiration of the granted term and is not
categorized as a forfeiture. Hence the rules which have developed
about the maxim, "Equity abhors forfeitures," are, in the main, in-
applicable.8
3. The event occasioning termination of the lessee's interest is
normally failure of production at or after the expiration of the pri-
1. McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co., 75 Mont. 356, 243 Pac. 582
(1926).
2. Taylor v. Kinbell, 219 La. 731, 54 So. 2d 1 (1951).
3. Joyce v. Wyant, 105 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Mich. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.
2d 363 (6th Cir. 1953).
4. Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 39 Cal. 2d 93, 244
P. 2d 895 (1952) (the lessee continued in possession after the end of the
primary term while production was not in paying quantities and the lessor
continued to accept payment of royalties; held, the lessee became a tenant
from month to month, and notice to quit was necessary to terminate the
tenancy) ; Moon v. Marker, 26 Cal. App. 2d 33, 78 P. 2d 460 (3d Dist. 1938)
(lessee became a tenant at suffrance when he continued in possession after end
of primary term during which he had failed to produce, and hence he was not
entitled to notice to surrender possession as a prerequisite to the maintenance
of a suit for possession, nor was it necessary that all lessors join in the
action to recover possession).
5. In Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 200 F. 2d 920 (10th Cir. 1952),
it is suggested that if the lessee holding over after the end of his term is a
trespasser, he is a good-faith rather than a bad-faith trespasser, and hence
he would be able to recover the value of improvements made in good faith,
and, had he obtained production, he could have set off the reasonable cost of
production against the recovery by the landowner of the value of the oil
produced. But cf. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 S. W. 190 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1925), rehearing granted, 291 S. W. 538 (Tex. Comm. App.
1927) in which a holdover lessee was held to be a trespasser and liable for
loss in the speculative value of the premises when he drilled a dry hole.
6. See, e.g., Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S. W. 2d 783, 137
A. L. R. 1032 (1941). But cf. Eggleson v. McCasland, 98 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.
Okla. 1951) (productive gas well drilled but lack of pipe line connection
prevented marketing. After seven years during which the lessee expended
substantial sums in developing the nearby area in the hope of getting a pipe
line connection, the lessor claimed the lease had terminated at the end of
the primary term. Held for the lessee. One of the bases for the decision of
the court was its conclusion that termination of the lease under the proven
facts would be inequitable.)
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mary term.7 In construing the word "production" in this context,
most courts have declared that in the light of the purposes of an oil
and gas lease, production means "production in paying quantities."8
In other words, there must be sufficient production to permit the,
lessee to realize a profit over and above his costs.'
Since accounting is an art as well as a science, it may frequently
be difficult to ascertain whether the small production which the
lessee has from the premises is profitable production. Of particular
importance in this connection is the determination of the share of the
lessee's overhead to be attributed to the particular leasehold. There
are a number of other important questions in this context. Must the
lessee produce at a profit after paying both the lessor's royalty and
the overriding royalty or oil payment retained by the lessee's as-
signor in transferring the leasehold? Apparently the latter is ex-
cluded in making this decision.10 What is the appropriate time
period for ascertaining whether production is profitable? Is this to
be ascertained over a period of a week, a month, or six months? Are
unusual non-recurrent expenses to be included in the cost totals in
making this calculation? Generally it is said that the production
must be at a profit "under normal conditions" and over a reasonably
long period of time.1 Another question arises as to whether the
lease may be kept alive if one well is producing at a profit, or if gas
is being produced at a profit, even though the leasehold as a whole
7. Town of Tome Land Grant, Inc. v. Ringle Development Co., 56
N. M. 101, 240 P. 2d 850 (1952) (no production from premises at end of
term and questionable that gas well which had been shut in was capable of
production in paying quantities; held, the lease expired at the end of the
primary term).
S. See Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S. W. 2d 509 (1942); and
cases discussed by Williams, Primary Term and Delay Rental Provisions,
Southwestern Legal Foundation, Second Annual Institute on Oil and Gas
Law and Taxation 106-114 (1951). But cf. Hudson v. Lyons, 199 Okla. 348,
186 P. 2d 309 (1947). When owners of separate, non-contiguous tracts joined
in a single joint or community lease, production on one of the tracts was
qufficient to keep the lease alive after the expiration of the primary term on
all of the tracts, even though royalties were not apportioned among all the
lessors. A. Veeder Co. v. Pan American Production Co., 205 La. 599, 17
So. 2d S91 (1944). See Summers, Oil and Gas § 298 (perm. ed. 1938).
9. The term paying quantities has a different meaning when used in
the contexts of the development clause of a lease or of the implied covenants.
In these contexts, a well is not producing in paying quantities unless produc-
tion is sufficient to repay the cost of drilling the well. See Renner v. Hunting-
ton-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 39 Cal. 2d 93, 98-99, 244 P. 2d 895, 899 (1952).
10. See, e.g., Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App. 2d 616,
191 P. 2d 129 (2d Dist. 1948) and Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So.
2d 724 (1949), declaring that such overriding royalties or oil payments should
not be included in computing costs for the purpose of determining whether
production is in paying quantities.
11. Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S. W. 2d 509 (1942) ; Transport
Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App. 2d 616, 191 P. 2d 129 (2d Dist. 1948).
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is producing at a loss.1 2 'When production is not in paying quantities,
the acceptance of royalties by the lessor does not prevent him from
claiming that the lease has expired by its terms.1 3
4. Drilling operations14 or production under a pooling or uniti-
zation agreement on the pool or unit but off the leased premises
serves to keep the lease alive as to the portion of the premises which
was included in the pool or unit1 5 and, under some authority, even
as to the portion not included in the pool or unit,1 both during and
after the expiration of the primary term. Absent statutory authority
for compulsory pooling or unitization1 7 or authorization by the les-
sor to the lessee either in the lease or in a separate agreement to pool
or unitize,1 8 production on the pooled or unitized tract but off the
leased premises does not have this effect.
The harshness of the rule providing for automatic termination of
the lessee's estate upon the occurrence of the limiting event, failure
of production in paying quantities, has been ameliorated to some
extent by the courts and by careful drafting of leases.
1. It is generally held that mere temporary cessation of produc-
tion at or after the expiration of the primary term does not occasion
termination of the lease. Obviously difficult questions may arise as
to what is "temporary."' 9 In one case cessation of production from
12. See discussion in Williams, supra note 8, at 109-112.
13. Gas Ridge, Inc. v. Suburban Agricultural Properties, Inc., 150 F.
2d 363, rehearing denied, 150 F. 2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U. S. 796 (1946), rehearing denied, 327 U. S. 815, 327 U. S. 817 (1946);
Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 36 Cal. 2d 93, 244 P. 2d
895 (1952); Loeffler v. King, 228 S. W. 2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 149 Tex. 626, 236 S. W. 2d 772 (1951). But such
acceptance has been said to be evidence that the lease has not terminated.
Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949) ; Eggleson v. McCasland,
98 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Okla. 1951).
14. McClain v. Harper, 206 Okla. 437, 244 P. 2d 301 (1952) (the
lease contained a drilling operations clause; shortly before the expiration of
the primary term the lessee began drilling on the unit but off the plaintiff's
tract which was part of the unit).
15. Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946).
16. Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947);
LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950);
Gray v. Cameron, 218 Ark. 142, 234 S. W. 2d 769 (1950). The lease itself,
if it authorizes pooling or unitization, or the unitization agreement, fre-
quently expressly so provides. Jackson v. Hunt Oil Co., 208 La. 156, 23 So.
2d 31 (1945).
17. The units involved in the Hunter and LeBlanc cases, supra note 16,
were created by the conservation commission under statutory authority. The
leases were saved from termination by production on the pooled or unitized
tract, both as to the portions of the leased premises included within and
the portions not included within the pool or unit.
18. As in Scott v. Pure Oil Co., 194 F. 2d 393 (5th Cir. 1952), 31
Texas L. Rev. 75.
19. In Stimson v. Tarrant, 132 F. 2d 363 (9th Cir. 1942), cert, denied,
319 U. S. 751 (1943), suspension of production for 14 months by reason of
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1930 to 1934 was held to be temporary.20 It would seem that this
case represents a holding contrary to the weight of authority as to
the relevance of the acceptance of royalties by the lessor and other
equitable considerations to the expiration of a lease under a clause
of limitation. Apparently the court was reluctant boldly to announce
a holding contrary to the weight of authority and hence couched its
opinion in terms of "temporary" cessation of production.
2. When the failure to obtain production prior to the end of the
primary term is due to wrongful acts of the lessor or to his inter-
ference with the drilling operations of the lessee, the failure of pro-
duction at that time is excused if production is obtained within a
reasonable time after the expiration of the primary term.21
3. Some cases have saved leases despite the failure to produce
if a well capable of production was drilled during the life of the lease
and only lack of a market postponed the beginning of production in
paying quantities. 22 The usual construction of the habendum clause
in Kansas precludes this result, but in a recent case it was held that
the presence of a drilling operations clause in the lease caused a
change in the normally applicable rule.2 3 The reasoning of the court
was that the parties to the drilling operations clause necessarily con-
templated some time lag between the completion of a well and the
beginning of production, during which time the lease was kept alive
after the expiration of the primary term. It then declared that con-
sistency required that the habendum clause receive the same con-
struction. Hence, the lease was not terminated at the end of the pri-
mary term even though there was then no production if a well had
been completed during the primary term and production began
within a reasonable time of its completion and of the end of the pri-
mary term. Quaere: is it rational to adopt a varying construction of
the habendum clause based on the largely chance factor of the pres-
ence or absence of a drilling operations clause? Is the court evi-
dencing a reluctance to apply "the normal rule of construction" in
this context by grasping at a straw as the basis for the making of
an exception to the "normal" rule?
absence of a market and storage facilities was found to be temporary. In
Reynolds v. McNeill, 218 Ark. 453, 236 S. W. 2d 723 (1951), the lessee ob-
tained production during the primary term but at the end of the term he was
not producing, apparently because fine sand had filtered into the bottom of
the drill casing and had obstructed the flow of oil. The court sustained the
holding of the chancellor that the lessee might have sixty days of grace in
which to resume paying production.
20. Saulsberry v. Siegel, 252 S. W. 2d 834 (Ark. 1952).
21. Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909).
22. Christianson v. Champlin Ref. Co., 169 F. 2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948).
23. Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P. 2d 465 (1952).
1954]
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4. In a number of modern leases, the "thereafter" clause has
been modified to provide that the lease may be kept alive after the
expiration of the primary term by something other than production,
e.g., by continuous drilling operations with not more than a 60 or 90
day interval between the cessation of drilling operations on one well
and the commencement of operations on another well.24 An example
is the following clause:
"Subject to the further provisions hereof, this lease shall con-
tinue in full force and effect for a period of five (5) years from
this date, hereinafter referred to as the primary term, and as
long thereafter as either (1) oil, gas, or any other mineral is
produced from the land herein leased or from any land with
which said land or any part thereof is then unitized as herein-
after provided, or (2) the shut in well money is paid in accord-
ance with paragraph 3 (b) hereof, or (3) drilling operations are
conducted in good faith on the land herein leased or on any land
with which the land herein leased or any part thereof is then
unitized as herein provided. As used in this lease, drilling opera-
tions shall include any activity on the leased premises or on land
with which the leased premises or any part thereof is then
unitized in a good faith effort to obtain, increase, improve or re-
establish production from such leased premises or unit; drilling
operations shall be considered as being conducted in good faith
if not more than ninety (90) days are permitted to elapse be-
tween the cessation of production or drilling operations as here-
in defined on one well and the commencement of drilling opera-
tions on another well or hole upon the leased premises or on
lands with which the leased premises or any part thereof is then
unitized. 25
A common type of drilling operations clause (called a "well
completion clause") serves to keep the lease alive after the expira-
tion of the primary term by virtue of current drilling operations,
but if the well then being drilled proves to be a dry hole, the lease
may not be preserved by further operations. 26
Typically the courts have been liberal in finding commencement
of drilling operations under clauses of these types where only the
most preliminary steps have been taken towards drilling.27 In such
cases, however, the drilling operations must be prosecuted with rea-
24. See, e.g., Humphrys v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 F. 2d 989 (5th Cir. 1936) ;
Christianson v. Champlin Ref. Co., 169 F. 2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948); St. Louis
Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 193 F. 2d 778 (5th Cir. 1952); Rogers v.
Osborn, 250 S. W. 2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
25. This clause was used in the lease construed in West v. Continental
Oil Co., 194 F. 2d 869 (5th Cir. 1952).
26. Wickham v. Skelly Oil Co., 106 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Okla. 1952),
aff'd, 202 F. 2d442 (10th Cir. 1953).
27. Aldrich v. Gypsy Oil Co., 132 Okla. 13, 268 Pac. 1109 (1928);
Guleke v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 S. W. 2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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sonable diligence .2 There is some doubt whether drilling operations
can be said to have commenced if a well permit has not been obtained
from the appropriate regulatory agency.
2 9
The shut-in gas well clause considered infra, may permit of the
continuance of a leasehold interest despite non-production if a pro-
ducing formation has been tapped and the failure to produce is due
to the absence of a market. The production requirement of the
"thereafter" clause has occasionally been rewritten to define the pro-
duction required to keep the lease alive in terms other than "paying
quantities," or to define "paying quantities" in terms of production
of a given amount of oil.30
THE DRILLING OR DELAY RENTAL CLAUSE
Lessors are obviously concerned with obtaining the economic
benefits of an oil and gas lease at as early a date as possible. Some
early leases were for long terms and contained no drilling obligations
on the part of the lessees. Lessors were dissatisfied if the lessee did
not commence drilling operations with reasonable diligence as no re-
turns from the leasehold accrued to the lessor during the period of
the lessee's inactivity.
One solution to this problem was the exaction from the lessee,
as part of the lease, of a covenant to commence drilling operations
within a relatively brief period of time and to continue drilling op-
erations with reasonable diligence thereafter until a given number of
wells had been drilled. So called "drill or forfeit" clauses of this gen-
eral type are in use today in some states. They generally provide
that on failure of the lessee to drill within a stated period of time,
the lessor may declare a forfeiture of the lease. Typically the lessor
may assert forfeiture only on the expiration of a stated time after
notice of the breach to the lessee.3 1 Lessees generally are not willing
28. Flanigan v. Stem, 204 Ky. 814, 265 S. W. 324 (1924).
29. In Goble v. Goff, 327 Mich. 549, 42 N. W. 2d 845 (1950), an evenly
divided court sustained a trial court decree that drilling had not been com-
menced despite preparatory operations on the premises by the lessee on the
ground that he had not obtained the required permit to drill. Failure to ob-
tain a well permit was viewed as indicating absence of good faith in "com-
mencing" drilling operations in Illinois Mid-Continent Co. v. West, 122 Ind.
App. 17, 102 N. E. 2d 390 (1951).
30. Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 39 Cal. 2d 93,
244 P. 2d 895 (1952) ; McLean v. Kishi, 173 S. W. 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
31. See, e.g., Swigert v. Stafford, 85 Cal. App. 2d 469, 193 P. 2d 106
(2d Dist. 1948) ; Prairie Oil Co. v. Carleton, 91 Cal. App. 2d 555, 205 P. 2d
81 (4th Dist. 1949). In Brightwell v. Norris, 242 S. W. 2d 201 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951), on breach of a covenant by the lessee to drill, the lessor was said
to be entitled in equity to a cancellation or recission of the lease. In another
part of the opinion the court declared that the lease terminated automatically
on the expiration of the period allowed for drilling under the lessee's covenant.
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to make such covenants except in the case of leases obtained in
proven territory, and the problem of enforcing such covenants made
them unsatisfactory even to the lessor with sufficient bargaining
power to obtain such a covenant.
Equity rarely if ever will order specific performance of a cove-
nant to drill,32 and the lessor will be remitted to his action for dam-
ages at law in the event of breach by the lessee. Although in some
states the lessor may recover what it would have cost the lessee to
perform his obligation to drill,33 the normal rule of damages is that
an injured party is entitled to be compensated for his loss. Clearly
his loss is not measured by what performance would have cost the
lessee but is measured by the revenues which he would have received
had the lessee performed, that is, the royalties the lessor would have
received had the well been drilled.3 4
Performance of his covenant by the lessee would normally have
profited the lessor in one other way.35 While drilling operations were
being pursued, the value of his retained royalty interest would have
increased since drilling operations seem always to have this effect.
Perhaps damages might be measured by the amount he could have
received for the purchase of his royalty interest or by the amount
which he might have obtained as a bonus for a lease on his retained
land not subject to the particular lease executed to the defaulting
lessee. But, entirely apart from the difficult problem of proof of
what the increment would have been had drilling operations been
prosecuted by the lessee, the lessor would not have suffered this
loss unless he would have sold his royalty interest or executed a new
lease on his retained adjacent lands. To recover damages measured
32. See Summers, Oil & Gas § 533 (perm. ed. 1938).
33. See, e.g., R. Olsen Oil Co. v. Fidler, 199 F. 2d 868 (10th Cir. 1952);
Smith v. Kious, 194 Okla. 17, 147 P. 2d 442 (1944); Fite v. Miller, 196 La.
876, 200 So. 285 (1940); Note, 122 A. L. R. 446 (1939). Contra: Riddle
v. Lanier, 136 Tex. 130, 145 S. W. 2d 1094 (1941) (cost of drilling well
as measure of damages for breach of covenant to drill declared to have been
entirely repudiated "except perhaps in cases where the cost has been paid
in advance for the drilling of a well, which, when and if completed, will
belong entirely to the owner of the land or leases, and in which the driller will
have no interest." Id. at 134, 145 S. W. 2d at 1096).
34. Guardian Trust Co. v. Brothers, 59 S. W. 2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) (error ref'd) ; Taubert v. Earle, 133 S. W. 2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939). It will usually be virtually impossible to prove this loss for had there
been sufficient evidence to justify a jury in finding that the well if drilled or
completed would have been a producer, the lessee would almost certainly
have drilled the well.
35. When a covenant to drill is made in a contract other than a lease,
as, e.g., when a transfer of land is made for consideration of a promise to
drill, the covenantee, on breach of the covenantor, may be able to recover
the value to him of the geological information which he would have obtained
on the drilling of the well. Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 F. 2d 589 (10th
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 608 (1930).
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in this fashion, the lessor must generally prove that he would have
sold and that he could have sold ;36 the proof of the loss of a specific
opportunity to sell may be required before he will be permitted to
recover damages measured in this fashion.37 Because of the diffi-
culty of proof of damages a liquidated damages clause is occasionally
used.38
Another solution of the lessor's problem of obtaining either early
drilling operations or a periodic return from the lease was the exe-
cution of a lease with an extremely short primary term of three
months to a year. Reluctance of lessees to take such leases renders
this theoretical possibility of little value.
The addition of a delay rental clause to the typical oil and gas
lease was the result of the search for a method assuring the lessor
of some return from the leasehold during the continuance of the
leasehold pending commencement of production by the lessee.
There are two types of delay rental clauses in use, the so-called
"or" clause and the "unless" clause. Typical language of an "or"
clause is as follows:
"Second party (lessee) agrees to commence operations on said
premises within [one year] from this date, or thereafter to pay
to the first party (lessor) [one] dollar per acre per annum an-
nually until a well is drilled, or the property hereby granted is
conveyed to the first party."
The "unless" clause, on the other hand, reads in general as
follows:
"If operations for drilling are not commenced on said land on
or before [one] year from this date the lease shall then termi-
nate as to both parties, unless on or before such anniversary
date Lessee shall pay or tender to Lessor or to the credit of
Lessor in - Bank at ., (which
bank and its successors are Lessor's agent and shall continue
as the depository for all rentals payable hereunder regardless
of changes of ownership of said land or the rentals either by
conveyance or by the death or incapacity of Lessor) the sum
of Dollars, ($ ), (herein called rental),
which shall cover the privilege of deferring commencement of op-
erations for drilling for a period of twelve (12) months. In like
manner and upon like payments or tenders annually the com-
36. Riddle v. Lanier, 136 Tex. 130, 145 S. W. 2d 1094 (1941).
37. Fite v. Miller, 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650, 122 A. L. R. 446 (1939).(The lessee assigned Y interest in a leasehold on consideration of a covenant
to drill a well. The assignee breached the covenant Held, proof that lessee
could have sold the lease for $5000. does not justify recovery of that sum
as damages for breach of contract absent an allegation that the lessee would
have sold if he bad not previously assigned a %2 interest to the assignee.)
38. United States v. Hole, 38 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mont. 1941).
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mencement of operations for drilling may be further deferred for
successive periods of twelve (12) months each during the pri-
mary term."
The distinguishing characteristic of the two types of clauses is
that in the "or" clause the lessee covenants to drill or to pay delay
rentals. The addition of a clause in the usual "or" lease, which per-
mits the lessee to surrender the lease at his option upon the pay-
ment of the nominal sum of $1 merely provides a third option for
the lessee. With this clause added, he promises "to drill or to pay
rentals or to surrender the lease." If he fails to surrender the lease
or to drill prior to an anniversary date of the lease, the lessor may
sue for and collect the rentals.39
Lessees were not entirely satisfied with the "or" clause, even
with the addition of a surrender clause, for generally they did not
desire to make any promises concerning initial drilling operations
on the land. As a result, the "unless" clause came into common use.
The lessee using this clause makes no promises whatsoever as re-
gards initial drilling.40 He can keep the lease alive during the pri-
mary term by drilling operations or by the payment of rentals, but
he is not required to do either. If he fails to do either, then the lease
automatically terminates upon the anniversary date.
In short, under the "or" clause, the lessee covenants to "drill
or pay," or to "drill or pay or surrender." If he does none of these
things, the lessor may sue for rentals or he may forfeit the lease. 41
Under the "unless" clause, the lessee covenants nothing, but the
lease will terminate automatically "unless" the lessor commences
drilling operations or pays rentals.
The option of the lessor to forfeit the lessee's interest for failure
to commence drilling operations or pay rentals is generally con-
strued to be akin to the common law right of entry, or, to use the
phrase used in the Restatement of Property, a power of termina-
39. Cohn v. Clark, 48 Okla. 500, 150 Pac. 467, L. R. A. 1916B 686
(1915).
40. There usually are, of course, express or implied covenants concern-
ing protection of the premises from drainage or development of the premises.
41. Occasionally forfeiture for failure to drill or pay has been allowed
even though the lease contained no forfeiture clause. Hickernell v. Gregory,
224 S. W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). Generally, however, forfeiture is not
an available remedy absent an express forfeiture clause in the lease. Girolami
v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 365 Pa. 455, 76 A. 2d 375 (1950). The lessor may
elect to waive his rights under a forfeiture clause and sue for rentals. Cohn
v. Clark, 48 Okla. 500, 150 Pac. 467, L. R. A. 1916B 686 (1915) W. Va.
Code Ann. § 3573 (1949) provides for forfeitures of a lease if delay rentals
are not paid within 60 days after notice of default is given to the lessee and
demand made for payment.
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tion. 42 As was true at common law, the termination of an estate by
exercise of a right of entry or power of termination requires affirma-
tive re-entry by the lessor, or, if the lessee resists, judicial process
to obtain possession of the land. The courts treat the power of ter-
mination as a forfeiture provision. Although judicial antipathy to
forfeiture clauses is not as pronounced in the case of oil and gas
leases as in the case of other conveyances, courts occasionally give
relief from the forfeiture when certain equities favoring the person
whose interest is sought to be forfeited are found. Thus, if failure
to commence drilling operations or to pay rentals was due to un-
foreseen and fortuitous circumstances, equity will normally grant
relief from forfeiture to a lessee who is ready, willing and able to
perform his obligations.43
The "or" lease has substantially been replaced by the "unless"
lease. Inasmuch as the lessee using this lease has covenanted noth-
ing concerning initial drilling operations and is not liable for failure
to drill, the courts have not been as anxious to protect him from
forfeiture of his interest. The "unless" clause has been construed
generally, therefore, as one of special limitation which operates
automatically to extinguish the estate granted upon the happening
of the designated event (non-payment of rentals where drilling op-
erations have not been commenced.) 44 Historically termination of
an estate by a special limitation was not treated as a forfeiture, and
the equitable doctrines applicable to relief from forfeiture have
been treated as irrelevant. Generally speaking the categorization
of the "unless" clause as one of limitation rather than forfeiture
has led the courts to say that the estate granted terminates auto-
matically and that the equitable considerations which are relevant
to the operation of the forfeiture clause of an "or" lease are irrele-
vant in the case of an "unless" lease. Thus, whatever the difficul-
ties or impediments encountered by the lessee in commencing drill-
ing operations or whatever his innocent mistake in failure to make
timely and full payment of delay rentals, the lease terminates upon
his failure to do one or the other by the anniversary date of the
lease.45
Under an "unless" lease, great care must be exercised in the
42. Restatement, Property § 24 (1936).
43. See Walker, Cases on Oil & Gas 522 and cases cited (1949).
44. Termination is automatic even though the lease contains a provision
for notice of default to be given the lessee upon his breach of any term in
the agreement. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Bloomfield, 103 Cal. App. 2d 589, 229
P. 2d 838 (2d Dist. 1951).
45. Phillips Pet. Co. v. Curtis, 182 F. 2d 122 (10th Cir. 1950).
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payment of delay rentals. Thus in one case, 46 a leasehold was lost
despite timely deposits of delay rentals in the depository bank when
the lessee instructed the bank to credit the deposit to the lessor and
his wife. Even though the land involved was community property,
and therefore the wife had an interest therein, the lease had been
executed by the husband alone and called for deposit of the rentals
to the lessor's credit.
Sometimes the lessee is in doubt as to the person entitled to
receive delay rentals. For example, he may not be sure as to the
interests of two or more persons who have joined in the lease. In
such a case there is authority permitting him to deposit the rentals
in a bank payable jointly to all the lessors.47 Or, if the lessee is in
doubt, he may apply to a court of equity to appoint a trustee to re-
ceive the delay rentals and tender payment to the court or to the
trustee prior to the due date.48 By statute in Mississippi, it is pro-
vided that in certain situations payment may be made directly to
a minor or to a parent of the minor where the minor has no guar-
dian.41
To guard against the possibility of dereliction in payment of
delay rentals to assignees of the lessor, the lease should make speci-
fic provision to the effect that the lessee is not bound by assignments
of the lessor's interest until a given number of days (e.g., 30 days)
after receipt of a certified copy of a recorded instrument evidencing
such transfer or change in ownership.50
Occasional trouble develops over the due date of delay rental
payments. The anniversary date of the lease may be in doubt by
reason of the fact that the lease is dated as of one day, executed by
the lessors on another day, and perhaps acknowledged and recorded
on still other days. Considerable care must be exercised in such in-
stances. In one case, 51 and "unless" lease was dated October 8, 1943
but was not delivered until November 26, 1943. Delay rentals were
tendered in a subsequent year after October 8 but before November
26. The court held that the former of the two dates was the anni-
46. Clingman v. Devonian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937).
47. Perkins v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 148 S. W. 2d 266 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941).
48 . Stady v. The Texas Co., 150 Kan. 420, 94 P. 2d 322 (1939) (The
lessee having failed to obtain the appointment of a trustee to receive rentals and
having failed to make payment, the lease terminated. Failure to pay was not
excused by the fact that the lessee did not know who was entitled to payment).
49. Miss. Laws 1944, c. 308; Miss. Code Ann. § 448 (1942).
50. The lessee may refuse to give effect to any notice not in accordance
with that specified in this clause. Pearce v. Southern Nat. Gas Co., 220 La.
1094, 58 So. 2d 396 (1952).
51. Hughes v. Franklin, 201 Miss. 215,29 So. 2d 79 (1947).
[Vol. 38:97
THE DELAY RENTAL CLAUSES
versary date upon which rentals were due. In another case,5 2 a
correction lease was executed to rectify a mistake in the first lease.
The court held that the first and not the correction lease determined
the anniversary date for delay rental payments. Another recent
case'- concerned a lease which bore the date May 20, 1947, but
which was actually signed and acknowledged by the several les-
sors between June 12 and July 15, 1947. It was delivered on July
15, 1947. The aniversary date for payment of rentals was held to
be the date the lease bore, May 20, and not the date of delivery,
July 15. Difficulty in this regard can easily be avoided by specifying
in the delay rental clause the date upon which payments are due.
Despite the requirement of timeliness of payment of delay ren-
tals, there is authority that a lessee may pay rentals on Monday if
the anniversary date falls on the preceding Sunday, and still keep
the lease alive. 4 It is, however, usually a mistake in policy on the
part of the lessee to delay payment of rentals until the last possible
day; the risks involved of failure to make tender on the proper day
are obviously too great.
There are some real or apparent exceptions found in a few
cases to this historical approach that the "unless" clause is one of
limitation which operates automatically. Among these are the fol-
lowing:
1. Equitable considerations may be important in that the court
will be moved thereby to adopt a construction of the lease which
does not involve termination of the lessee's estate.5 Thus in a re-
cent case,5 production under a lease fell to approximately six bar-
rels per day after the expiration of the primary term, an amount
insufficient to pay the cost of lifting the oil, and the lease expired.
The lessor and the lessee agreed to the execution of a new lease on
the same premises, which was duly executed and became effective
on August 5, 1947. As a result of a material advance in the price
of oil in 1947, the revenue from the well increased to the extent
that it exceeded the cost of operations and paid a profit. The lessee
did no additional drilling and did not pay delay rentals in 1948. In
an action by the lessor to establish that the new lease had termi-
nated, the court held for the lessee. Although royalties payable to
52. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Mullican, 144 Tex. 609, 192 S. W. 2d
770 (1946).
53. Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 200 F. 2d 920 (10th Cir. 1952).
54. Armstrong v. McGough, 157 Ark. 173, 247 S. W. 790, 29 A. L. R.
236 (1923). See Summers, Oil and Gas § 346 (Derm. ed. 1938).
55. See St. Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 193 F. 2d 778 (5th
Cir. 1952) and cases discussed in Williams, supra note 8, at 117-119.
56. West v. Continental Oil Co., 194 F. 2d 869 (5th Cir. 1952).
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the lessor were less than the amount of delay rentals provided for
by the lease, production was in paying quantities. The court con-
strued the lease to mean that production from the well which at the
time of the execution of the lease was not in paying quantities could
keep the leasehold alive by virtue of the rise in price unforeseen at
the time of the execution of the new lease, without the necessity of
engaging in further drilling operations or the payment of delay
rentals.
2. In some cases the leasehold interest has survived failure to
make timely payment of rentals when an effort to make such pay-
ment was aborted by accident or mistake.57
3. The leasehold has been permitted by other courts to con-
tinue where the lessee's failure to gain production was due to in-
terference b'y the lessor with drilling operations or to his premature
declaration of forfeiture or termination of the lease.
s
4. By late acceptance of delay rentals by the lessor, the lease
may be saved.59 However, if the lessor is unaware at the time he
accepts payment of rentals that the lessee has failed to perform his
obligations under a lease, such acceptance has been held not to bar
his assertion that the lease has terminated.60
5. Even though an inadequate payment of delay rentals is made
to the owner of an undivided interest, the lease may be saved if
the inadequacy of payment is due to misconstruction by the lessee
of an ambiguous instrument executed subsequent to the leasing
transaction.1 In a recent Oklahoma case,12 for example, the lessee
paid the entire rental to the depository bank in ample time. Not
being sure of the appropriate means of dividing the rentals among
the owners of interests therein, the instruments conveying such in-
terests being ambiguous, the lessee made no directions to the bank
as to the division of the rentals. The bank credited the entire rental
payment to the original lessor. The court held that the lease was
57. See Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (1953) and cases
discussed in Williams, supra note 8, at 121-126, and Note, 5 A. L. R. 2d 993
(1944). Illustrative of the strict view that the lease terminates automatically
on failure to make timely payment of rentals are Vaughan v. Doss, 219 Ark.
963, 245 S. W. 2d 826 (1952) (lessees by mistake mailed delay rentals to
wrong bank) ; Phillips Pet. Co. v. Curtis, 182 F. 2d 122 (10th Cir. 1950) ;
Ellison v. Skelly Oil Co., 206 Okla. 496, 244 P. 2d 832 (1952) (delay rentals
sent to wrong depository bank).
58. See cases discussed in Williams, supra note 8, at 126-127.
59. Id. at 127-129.
60. Brightwell v. Norris, 242 S. W. 2d 201 (Tem. Civ. App. 1951).
61. See Jones v. Southern Nat. Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34(1948) and cases discussed in Williams, supra note 8, at 129-133.
62. Superior Oil Co. v. Jackson, 207 Okla. 437, 250 P. 2d 23 (1952).
[Vol. 38:97
THE DELAY RENTAL CLAUSES
not terminated as to the interests of owners who had not received
their proportionate share of the royalties.
It should be noted, however, that when the lessee is not required
to give effect to an assignment of the lessor's interest absent a no-
tice in specified form, if, in spite of non-receipt of the required
notice, he pays rentals in accordance with his erroneous construc-
tion of an instrument executed by the lessor subsequent to the lease,
he may lose all or a portion of the leasehold as a result.13
6. The lease may be saved if full payment of delay rentals has
been made even though such payment was made to the wrong per-
son, the original lessor rather than his assignee, when notice of the
assignment was received by the lessee subsequent to the payment
of the rentals but prior to the due date of payment.6 4 But, although
leases typically provide that the lessee is not under a duty to pay
rentals or royalties to an assignee of the lessor until he has received
notice of the assignment in a specified manner, this does not excuse
failure to make timely tender of rentals merely because the lessee
is not sure of the person or persons entitled thereto.65
7. Some courts have permitted revivor of a terminated lease by
reference thereto in a subsequently executed instrument as a valid
lease, even though such mention was not intended to revive the
leasehold. 68
8. Oral modification of delay rental provisions by acceptance
of substitute performance for payment of the rentals specified in
the lease has been given effect to save the leasehold.er
9. A few courts have gone so far as to suggest, at least tenta-
tively, that equitable considerations are directly relevant to the
termination of the lessor's estate under an "unless" lease, as, for
example, estoppel. 68
THE No-TE~m LEASE
Occasionally, apparently nearly always by mistake or by reason
of unthinking completion of blanks in store-bought forms,69 the
63. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576,46 So. 2d 907 (1950).
64. See cases discussed in Williams, supra note 8, at 133-134.
65. Stady v. The Texas Co., 150 Kan. 420, 94 P. 2d 322 (1939).
66. See Loeffler v. King, 149 Tex. 626, 236 S. W. 2d 772 (1951) and
caes discussed in Williams, supra note 8, at 134-135. Similarly an invalid
mineral deed may be made effective by recitations in a subsequent lease.
Hillmer v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 196 F. 2d 124 (5th Cir. 1952).
67. See cases cited in Williams, supra note 8, at 135.
68. See St. Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 193 F. 2d 778
(5th Cir. 1952) ; Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3
So. 2d 289 (1941); Jones v. Southern Nat Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So.
2d 34 (1948), and cases discussed in Williams, supra note 8, at 135-137.
69. Unthinking use of forms is always dangerous. See Williams, Hoff-
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same period of time is specified in the delay rental clause as is speci-
fied for the primary term of the lease. Thus, the blank for the dura-
tion of the primary term may be completed with the numeral "1"
or the word "one" so the lease is to last for one year "and so long
thereafter. . . ." Then the "unless" clause provides that the lease
shall terminate one year from date if drilling operations have not
then been commenced unless delay rentals are paid.70 Construing
these two clauses together, it is clear that there is in effect no pri-
mary term for the lease after which the lease can be kept alive only
by production. Instead, the lease may be kept alive indefinitely by
payment of delay rentals annually. The result is to create what is
known as a "no-term" lease.7'
Many early leases were consciously written as "no-term" leases.
It is unlikely that a modem lease is intended to be for "no-term."
Most "no-term" leases found to have been created by conveyances
in the last two decades probably resulted from mistake or mis-
understanding in the completion of the blanks in a lease form.7 2
The "no-term" lease is sometimes construed to create an estate
at will, terminable by either party,7 3 and sometimes construed as
an estate terminable by the lessor but only after notice of intent
given to the lessee followed by a reasonable period of time for the
commencement of drilling operations.74 In Michigan it has been
held that the primary term of one year was not extended by com-
mencement of drilling operations despite the presence of a delay
rental clause.75 Whatever the construction of this instrument, the
parties probably did not intend such consequences. The mistake is
one carefully to be guarded against.
So much by way of the general characteristics of the delay ren-
tal clause and its relation to the primary term clause. Let us turn
now to some of the problems which arise from the interrelation of
the delay rental clause and other clauses in the lease.
man v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.: The "Subject-to" Clause in Mineral and
Royalty Deeds, 30 Texas L. Rev. 395 (1952).
70. See, e.g., J. J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 226 N. W. 653,
67 A. L. R. 522 (1929).
71. See, e.g., Rosson v. Bennett, 294 S. W. 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
72. For a discussion of the no-term lease, see Summers, Oil and Gas §
289 (perm. ed. 1938).
73. Lanham v. Jones, 84 Colo. 129, 268 Pac. 521 (1928).
74. Indiana Nat. Gas & Oil Co. v. Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 76 N. E. 520
(1906). Lloyd's Estate v. Mullen Tractor & Equipment Co., 192 Miss. 62, 4
So. 2d 282 (1941), seems to go further in suggesting that the lessee may delay
drilling indefinitely by payment of delay rentals.
75. J. J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 226 N. W. 653, 67
A. L. R. 522 (1929). Contra: Consolidated Gas Co. v. Rieckhoff, 116 Mont.
1, 151 P. 2d 588 (1944).
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THE SHUT-IN GAS WELL CLAUSE
The marketing of the product after production has been obtained
sometimes causes difficulties. Where oil is produced, it is possible
to transport the product to market by truck or rail, if necessary,
prior to obtaining a pipe line connection. Where gas only is pro-
duced, however, truck or rail transportation does not provide a
substitute for a pipe line connection to market. Until the latter is
obtained, the product cannot be marketed execpt occasionally in
relatively small quantities in the immediate neighborhood. Particu-
larly when production is obtained only a short time before the nor-
mal expiration of the primary term of the lease, the non-availability
of a pipe line connection may raise critical problems.
The shut-in gas well clause has been added to lease forms to
take care of this contingency.76 In effect, it is a definition by the
parties of the word "production" in the "thereafter" clause. By
virtue of inclusion of this clause, the lease will be considered to be
producing in such quantities as are sufficient to keep it alive if (1)
the well is capable of producing gas in commercial quantities,77
and (2) the payment of the shut-in gas well royalty is timely and
in the appropriate amount.78 Incidentally, the sums paid under
such a clause are "royalties" and not "rentals. ' 7
As to the latter requirement, timely payment of the full amount
of the shut-in gas well royalty, we encounter the same problems
which were mentioned with reference to the payment of delay ren-
tals. The requirements as to timeliness of the payment and as to
payment in full are the same. If the payment be tendered a day late
or in an amount deficient by a few cents, the lease will not be kept
76. See Comment, Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases Providing for the
Pavnent of an Annual Sum as Royalty on a Nonproducing Gas Well, 24
Texas L. Rev. 478 (1946); Hardwicke, Problems Arising Out of Royalty
Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases in Texas, 29 Texas L. Rev. 790, 797 (1951);
Moses, Problems in Connection with Shut-in Gas Royalty Provisions in Oil
and Gas Leases. 23 Tulane L. Rev. 374 (1949), 27 Tulane L. Rev. 478 (1953).
Early clauses of this type applied only to wells from which "gas only" is
produced. The clause has been rewritten to apply to wells from which "gas
and/or distillate only" is produced. Variants in this clause are numerous. The
word "only" has been omitted from some shut-in gas well clauses, and many
leases expressly define a gas well to include wells capable of producing natural
gas, condensate, distillate or any gaseous substance, and wells classified as
gas wells by any government authority.
77. United States v. Brown, 15 F. 2d 565 (N.D. Okla. 1926) ; Taylor v.
Kimbell, 219 La. 731, 54 So. 2d 1 (1951).
78. Freeman v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S. W. 2d 339
(1943).
79. So held in Morriss v. First Nat. Bank, 249 S. W. 2d 269 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) (error ref'd n. r. e.), and hence owners of non-participating royalty
interests are entitled to share in the payment. Accord, Risinger v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941).
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alive.8 In one case, however, where the lease contained a clause
providing that the lessee might keep the lease alive by resuming
drilling operations within 90 days of the cessation of production
subsequent to the end of the primary term, it was held that pay-
ment of the shut-in royalty within 90 days of shutting-in a gas well
kept the lease alive.8' A difficult question as to the anniversary date
for payment in subsequent years could arise from such a holding.
Since the payment is of royalty rather than rental, the rule that
non-payment of royalty is not grounds for cancellation of a lease
is said to be applicable. But, unless paid, the lease may fail on the
anniversary date unless delay rentals are paid, and will fail at or
after the expiration of the primary term by reason of lack of pro-
duction.82
A recent Louisiana case illustrates the interrelation of several
clauses of a lease.8 3 The lease was for 10 years and contained a
"thereafter" and an "unless" clause. It also contained a shut-in gas
well clause, providing that if the shut-in gas well royalty were paid,
it would be considered that gas was being produced within the
meaning of the primary term clause. The lease also contained a dry
hole clause, requiring the resumption of drilling operations or of
rentals on the drilling of a dry hole prior to discovery of oil or gas.
During the primary term the lessee drilled a well which was
capable of producing gas in paying quantities but, no market then
being available, the well was shut-in. Neither delay rentals nor the
shut-in gas well royalty was paid. The lessors then sought an order
cancelling the lease. The court denied them this relief. The reason-
ing of the court was as follows:
1. The payment of the shut-in gas well royalty was optional
with the lessee. No forfeiture was provided for in the event of his
failure to pay such sum.
80. Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S. W, 2d
339 (1943).
81. Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S. W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)
(error refd, n. r. e.).
82. "* * * upon cessation of production after termination of the primary
term, the lease automatically terminates. * * * Here the parties agreed that
if no gas was being produced on April 7, 1940, the lease should terminate.
They further agreed that a gas well from which gas was not being sold or
used off the premises was a producing well provided a royalty of fifty dollars
was paid. Clearly, then, if the fifty dollars was not paid on or before April
7, 1940, gas was not being produced from the premises on that date, and the
lease terminated for nonproduction. That is precisely what the contracting
parties said should follow, and they were privileged to define what they
meant by the phrase 'a producing well."' Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
141 Tex. 274, 278, 171 S. W. 2d 339, 341 (1943).
83. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V. S. & P. R.R., 222 La. 383, 62 So. 2d
615 (1952).
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2. The lease required drilling operations or resumption of ren-
tals to keep the lease alive if a dry hole were drilled prior to dis-
covery of oil or gas; but this was not a dry hole, so this clause of
the lease is inapplicable.
3. The "unless" clause provided for the termination of the lease
if no well was drilled, unless rentals were paid. But, a well was
drilled, so the lessee was not required to pay rentals to keep his lease
alive.
Thus, under this lease it was possible, by virtue of the drilling
of a gas well capable of producing in paying quantities, to keep the
lease alive during the entire primary term without production or
the payment of delay rentals or shut-in gas well royalties. Then, just
before the expiration of the primary term, the lessee might elect to
pay the shut-in gas well royalty and keep the lease alive thereafter
as a "producing" well. Obviously the lease should be drafted to
avoid this consequence. The delay rental, shut-in gas well, and dry
hole clauses should be carefully interrelated so as to insure some
return to the lessor during the primary term if the lessee is not
engaged in drilling operations after the drilling of the first well
which is capable of producing in paying quantities but which does
not so produce for lack of a market.
Many early shut-in gas well royalty clauses were poorly drafted
from the viewpoint of the lessor in that they called for a payment
of a relatively small amount annually which might serve to keep
the leasehold alive on a substantial tract without further obligation
to continue drilling operations (except insofar as such an obligation
is imposed by the implied covenants of the lease) and without fur-
ther payment of delay rentals. The sum required to be paid under
this clause should be sufficiently substantial as to encourage the
lessee to seek diligently to obtain a pipe line connection, and should
be equal in amount, at least, to the delay rentals previously payable
to keep the lease alive, or, in the alternative, the lease should pro-
vide that the payment of royalty under this clause should suffice
to keep the lease alive only as to a given number of acres.
The requirement as to the timeliness of the payment becomes
of special importance in view of the fact that the anniversary date
under this clause is rarely, and then only by happenstance, the same
as the anniversary date for the payment of delay rentals. Under
this clause, the payments are usually due on the anniversary of the
shutting-in of the gas well.84 An e: tample may point up the problem.
84. Superior Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 240 S. IW. 2d 281
(Tex. 1951), 30 Texas L. Rev. 780 (1952), raised the related problem as
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A lease was duly executed and delivered on June 1, 1950. The
anniversary date upon which delay rentals was due, was, therefore,
June 1. During the first year a well was drilled and gas in com-
mercial quantities discovered. The well was shut in on May 1. To
keep the lease alive after June 1, normally payments under the delay
rental or shut-in gas well clause must be made on or before June
1.85 To keep the lease alive by virtue of the shut-in gas well clause,
payments are due in subsequent years on or before May 1.86 If the
payments under the delay rental and shut-in gas well clauses are
identical in amount, the lease may be kept alive during the primary
term by payments made prior to June 1 of each year, the lessee as-
serting the benefit of the delay rental clause.8 7 But, to keep the lease
alive after the primary term, or to keep it alive during the primary
to the anniversary date under a "dry-hole" clause. The anniversary date of
the lease was March 3. The anniversary of the dry hole was February 3. For
three years subsequent to the drilling of the dry hole, delay rentals were paid
prior to February 3 "for the period of February 3, 194.... to February 3, 194......
The Lessee assigned the leases to defendants in December, 1948, and defend-
ants tendered rentals to the lessors on February 5, 1949, which tender was
refused because payment had not been made by February 3. The court could
not agree on the construction of the lease involved in this case but held, two
judges dissenting, that the anniversary date for the payment of rentals was
changed to the date of the completion of the dry hole by the contemporaneous
construction of the parties to an ambiguous instrument, and hence the lease-
hold terminated on February 3, 1949 for failure to pay rentals. The problem
as to the due date of payments is the same under a dry-hole and under a
shut-in gas well clause.
It seems generally understood that the shut-in gas well royalty is due
annually in advance, in the absence of specific provision in the lease to the
contrary, and is due initially when the well is shut in. See Walker, supra note
76 at 480. Many leases provide that the anniversary date of the lease is the
due date for payments under the shut-in royalty. Hardwicke, stpra note 76,
at 799.
85. Under the "unless" clause, the drilling of a well during the year
may excuse payment of rentals at the next ensuing anniversary date. Pay-
ment usually must be resumed or new drilling operations commenced on or
before the second anniversary date.
86. Morris v. First Nat. Bank, 249 S. W. 2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)(error refd, n. r. e.), makes it clear that payment of the shut-in gas well
royalty will keep a lease alive during the primary term without further
payment of delay rentals or commencement of drilling operations.
87. Some doubt as to whether a lease may be kept alive during the
primary term by payment of delay rentals, as opposed to payment of the
shut-in gas well royalty, is raised by Morriss v. First Nat. Bank, supra note
86. The royalty clause (paragraph 3 of the lease) contained a shut-in gas
well provision that while the shut-in royalty was paid, such well shall be
held to be a producing well under paragraph 2 of the lease (the primary term
clause). The delay rental clause (paragraph 4) provided that if oil, gas or
other mineral is not being produced on the anniversary date, the lease shall
terminate unless delay rentals are paid. The court declared that "After pro-
duction the option to pay delay rentals, provided by paragraph 4, ceased. * * *
Since the fact of production did exist, the lease did not terminate upon a
failure to comply with the delay rental provision of paragraph 4. But after
production, paragraph 3 required the lessee to pay royalty. Hence, the royalty
under paragraph 3 was required to be paid, and the rentals under paragraph 4
were not required to be paid after production." Id. at 273.
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term by payments under the shut-in gas well clause, where that is
to the lessee's interests by reason of the fact that it is a smaller sum
than delay rentals, the sum is due on or before May 1, rather than
on or before June 1 of each year.
Another problem as to the anniversary date may be raised by
virtue of that fact that sometimes after the shutting-in of a gas well,
it may be reopened for the sale of gas to lessees drilling on adjoining
premises or for use by the lessee on another lease. Royalties must
be paid for such production. If after a period of production for such
purposes the well is again shut-in, the question arises as to whether
this creates a new anniversary date for payment of the shut-in gas
well royalty.
It should perhaps be emphasized that the shut-in gas well royalty
clause does not modify the implied covenants to use reasonable dili-
gence in marketing the gass8 and to develop the premises with rea-
sonable diligence.8 0
INTER-RELATION OF THE RENTAL AND OTHER CLAUSES IN A LEASE
One construction of the delay rental clause is that it has no effect
upon the habendum clause, and hence if, at the expiration of the
primary term, there is no production, the leasehold terminates even
though drilling operations are then being pursued which result in
production the next day °0 In some states, however, the delay rental
clause is held to enlarge the habendum clause as follows. If drilling
operations begin during a period for which delay rentals have been
paid, the lease continues so long as such drilling operations are pur-
sued with reasonable diligence.1 There is much to be said for the
latter position, but the lessee should not leave the matter in doubt
in drafting the lease. It is a relatively simple matter for him to pro-
vide specifically for the continuance of the term of the lease after
the primary term if drilling operations are in effect at its expira-
tion. When the lease contains such a clause, the courts require that
the operations be pursued with reasonable diligence to avoid ex-
tinguishment of the lessee's interest.92 Neither a drilling clause of
this type nor a shut-in gas well clause will change the lease from a
8. Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289(1941).
89. Amerada Pet. Corp. v. Doering, 93 F. 2d 540, 114 A. L. R. 1385(5th Cir. 1937).
90. 3. J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 226 N. W. 653, 67
A. L. R. 522 (1929).
91. McClanahan Oil Co. v. Perkins, 303 Mich. 448, 6 N. W. 2d 742(1942); Hieks v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 61, 76 P. 2d 269
(1938) ; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Rieckhoff, 116 Mont. 1, 151 P. 2d 588 (1944).
92. Flanigan v. Stem, 204 Ky. 814, 265 S. W. 324 (1924).
19541
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
determinable fee to a fee on condition subsequent. Such clauses are
effective only to redefine the event or condition upon the occurence
of which the lease will terminate.
As has been noted previously, to keep a lease alive after the ex-
piration of the primary term it is normally necessary that there be
production and that the production be in paying quantities. The
question arises as to whether the lease may be kept alive during the
primary term without the payment of delay rentals by virtue of pro-
duction which is not in paying quantities. In at least one case,93 the
suggestion has been made that any production will keep the lease
alive during the primary term and, moreover, that discovery without
further payment of delay rentals or production, may have that effect
during the primary term. Obviously the lessee should, for safety's
sake, resume payment of rentals during the primary term if his
production is not in paying quantities.
The lessor should scrutinize with great care the delay rental
clause in the lease submitted to him for signature lest it provide
that the drilling of a well during the primary term will serve to keep
the lease alive for the balance of the primary term without produc-
tion, further drilling operations, or payment of rentals. Such was the
effect of a lease provision construed in a Kentucky case." The lease
provided that the lessee shall drill and complete a well "on said
premises within six months from the date hereof, or pay annually
in advance at the rate of $1.50 an acre per year for each additional
year such completion is delayed .... [Ilt is further agreed ... that
the completion of a well ... shall be and operate as a full liquida-
tion of all rental under this provision during the remainder of the
term of this lease"9
The drilling of a dry hole in the first six months under this lease
was held sufficient to keep the lease alive for the balance of the pri-
mary term without the necessity of payment of delay rentals.
The lease should be specific as to the date upon which delay
rentals are to be resumed during the primary term in the event a
dry hole is drilled and there is no production from the premises.
Otherwise, controversy and litigation is invited. Thus, in Wilson
93. Cox v. Miller, 184 S. W. 2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (error
ref'd.) The lease contained a dry hole clause requiring resumption of drilling
operations or payment of rentals to keep the lease alive. A well capable of
producing gas in paying quantities was drilled but shut-in for lack of a
market. The suggestion that the well was not a dry hole meant that the lease
might be kept alive during the balance of the primary term without resump-
tion of rental payments.
94. Unity Oil Co. v. Hill, 200 Ky. 651, 255 S. W. 151 (1923).
95. Id. at 652-653, 255 S. W. at 152.
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v. Wakefield,"" the Kansas Supreme Court construed a lease exe-
cuted on October 10, 1935, containing a delay rental and a dry hole
clause. The former was in usual form, providing that "if no well be
commenced" on or before October 10, 1936, this lease shall termi-
nate unless the sum of $160 is paid, "which sum shall operate as a
rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of a
well for twelve months from said date. In like manner and upon
like payments or tenders the commencement of a well may be fur-
ther deferred for like periods of the same number of months suc-
cessively. '0 7 The dry hole clause provided that if the first well be a
dry hole, then if a second well is not commenced on said land within
twelve months from the expiration of the last rental period for which
rental has been paid, the lease shall terminate unless before the ex-
piration of said twelve months the lessor shall resume the payment
of rentals.
During the first year of the lease the lessee drilled a dry hole
which was completed on or about April 15, 1936. No rental was
paid before October 10, 1936, and on May 12, 1937, after the ex-
piration of twelve months from the anniversary of the dry hole, the
lessors sued to cancel the lease. The court held for the lessee, declar-
ing that the payment of rentals on the first anniversary date of the
lease subsequent to drilling of the dry hole was excused. Payment
of delay rentals or commencement of drilling operations on or be-
fore the next succeeding anniversary date was requisite to the con-
tinued validity of the lease.
Although payment of rentals may be suspended by drilling oper-
ations, most modem leases provide for the resumption of delay ren-
tals during the primary term when the well or wells drilled are dry
or when production ceases. The lease should be more specific as to
the date on which rentals or drilling operations are to be resumed
than was the lease construed in this case. The alternatives are three:
(1) on the lease anniversary date next succeeding the completion of
the well, (2) on the first anniversary of the completion of the dry
hole, or (3) as in this case, on the second anniversary date of the
lease after the completion of the dry hole. One of these alternatives
should be expressly provided for by the lease with such explicitness
as to avoid the possibility of controversy over the construction of
the language.
The lease construed in a recent case 9s illustrates the care that
96. 146 Kan. 693, 72 P. 2d. 978 (1937).
97. Id. at 694, 72 P. 2d at 979.
93. Glasseock v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 87 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. Tex.
1950), aff'd, 185 F. 2d 910 (5th Cir. 1950).
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should be used in drafting the delay rental clause. This lease pro-
vided that:
"Operations for the drilling of a well or reworking opera-
tions on any well on said land or production from any well
thereon shall continue this lease in force only in so far as this
lease covers a tract for each such well with respect to which op-
erations for drilling are being conducted, or on which rework-
ing operations are being conducted, or from which production
is being obtained, containing not more than 640 acres of land
(for each such well) to be designated by Lessee, such respective
tracts of not more than 640 acres to be of such shape or con-
figuration as may be designated by Lessee with the well on any
part thereof. * * * The aforementioned rental payable by Lessee
to cover the privilege of deferring commencement of operations
for the drilling of a well for periods of twelve (12) months each
during the primary term shall be reduced by an amount equal
to One Dollar ($1) per acre for each acre of land including
within any tract or tracts which Lessee is holding or entitled to
hold on the due date of the rental payment in question, by virtue
of the designation by Lessee prior to such due date of a tract or
tracts as above provided and the conduct of drilling or rework-
ing operations thereon or obtaining production therefrom." 99
Under this clause the lessor is insured of a return on the lease-
hold during the primary term. However, to the lessor's chagrin, this
clause was held to be applicable only to the primary term, and the
entire leasehold of 8400 acres was kept alive by production from
two wells after the expiration of the primary term.
EFFECT OF ASSIGNMENTS OF THE WORKING INTEREST
Not infrequently litigation results from the division of the les-
see's interest subsequent to the lease and failure by one of the owners
of a portion of the working interest to begin drilling operations or
to pay rentals prior to the anniversary date of the lease. If division
of the leasehold is not specifically authorized by the lease, the owner
of a divided interest in the leasehold may not keep the lease alive
as to his interest merely by paying the proportionate share of the
rentals attributable to his interest.1 10 However, if there are drilling
operations in effect on the portion of the leasehold held by another
operator, he need not pay rentals at all.10' Similarly, if after the ex-
piration of the primary term there is production from a portion of
the leasehold held by another, this will suffice to keep the leasehold
99. Id. at 916.
100. See Merrill, The Partial Assignee-Done in Oil, 20 Texas L. Rev.
298, 301 (1942).
101. See Walker, Cases on Oil and Gas 813 (1949).
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in its entirety. 0 2 There may be, of course, liability on the covenants
in the lease, express or implied, for development, which may result
in cancellation of the lease in whole or in part.10 3
If, however, the lease specifically provides for the possible divi-
sion of the working interest, as is usually the case, normally it will
further provide that the working interest in a segregated portion
of the leased premises may be kept alive by payment of the pro-
portionate part of the delay rentals attributable thereto. 0 4 By agree-
ment of the parties to the division of the working interest, it may be
provided that one will pay delay rentals for all, and this will appar-
ently be given effect. If, however, the owner of the working inter-
est in a segregated portion of the tract, absent such a prior agree-
ment, fails to make timely payment of delay rentals, the fact that
the owner of another subdivided portion pays the full delay rentals
due under the lease will not serve to keep the former's interest
alive.10 5
In Louisiana, production on one part of the divided leasehold
102. Berry v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 188 F. 2d 820 (5th Cir.
1951).
103. See State ex reL Shell Pet. Corp. v. Worden, 44 N. M. 400, 103
P. 2d 124 (1940).
104. Dorman Farms Co. v. Stewart, 157 Ark. 194, 247 S. W. 778
(1923) ; Pearce v. Southern Nat. Gas Co., 220 La. 1094, 58 So. 2d 396 (1952).
n Flanigan v. Stern, 204 Ky. 814, 265 S. W. 324 (1924), the lease permitted
partial assignments of the working interest and provided that defalcations
of an assignee should not affect the lessee as to his retained interest provided
he complied with his leasehold obligations as to his unassigned portions. The
lessee purported to assign 19% acres of his 20 acre leasehold and tendered
rentals for the 2 acre retained. It was held that the lease terminated on
failure to pay the rentals for the full 20 acres on the ground that the lessee
"had no right to keep the lease alive on any portion of the premises, which
he might select by relinquishing without consideration and without any bona
fide assignment, such portions of the lease as he found himself unable to re-
tain by the payment of the required rent. The right of assignment given to
the lessee under the lease contemplated a bona fide assignment of described
and designated portions of the lease, and there is no proof that any such was
made in this case. Were the rule otherwise plaintiff in this case, and other
lessees adopting a similar course, could relieve themselves of the payment
of any part of the obligated rent by giving away the greater undivided part of
the leased premises and retaining an insignificant portion which they deemed
most valuable, and thereby reducing the amount of rent required to be paid
by him in order to keep the remaining holdings alive. The law has no other
name for such conduct except that of a fraudulent scheme never contem-
plated by the parties and never enforced by the courts." Id, at 819-820, 265
S. WV. at 326. Accord, Young v. Jones, 222 S. W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
There is some authority to the effect that the provision in a lease per-
mitting division of the working interest by implication permits the owner of
the leasehold in a segregated portion of the tract to keep his interest alive by
paying a ratable share of delay rentals. Hitson v. Gilman, 220 S. W. 140
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920). This position is said to be unacceptable in Merrill,
supra note 100, at 302.
105. White v. Hunt, 193 Miss. 742, 10 So. 2d 539 (1942). But cf. Broyles
v. Gilman, 222 S. W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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will not serve to keep the lease alive on another portion of the di-
vided leasehold. 10 6 The weight of authority is contra; a producing
well on one portion of the leased premises will serve to keep the en-
tire leasehold alive both during the primary term without further
payment of rentals, and after the expiration of the primary term.
1 0 7
The lessor's only remedy thereafter against the lessee and his as-
signees is on the covenants in the lease, express or implied. 08
If an undivided share of the working interest is transferred, as
opposed to the transfer of the entire working interest in a segregated
portion of the tract, it would not seem that payment of a ratable
share of delay rentals would be sufficient to keep the interest alive.
In the Southland Royalty Co. case,10 9 similar questions were
raised as to a joint or community lease. The Supreme Court of Texas
held that production on one of the leased tracts serves to keep the
lease alive as to all included tracts, and commencement of a well
on any one of the tracts operates to excuse the payment of delay
rentals on all included tracts.
THE PROPORTIONATE REDUCTION CLAUSE
Even though the lessor is believed to own only an undivided
interest in a tract of land, it is frequently the practice for an oil and
gas lease to purport to convey to the lessee the entire fee. The pur-
pose in so phrasing the lease is to give the lessee the benefit of ap-
plication of the doctrine of after-acquired title and to convey to him
the entire interest of the lessor if it turns out to be greater than was
believed to be the case. Obviously the covenants of title should be
phrased to cover only the interest believed to belong to the lessor, or
he may be held liable for their breach despite the parties' knowledge
that the lease purported to convey more than the lessor had."l0
A "proportionate reduction" clause is frequently included in a
lease. Typical language of such a clause provides that, "In case said
lessor owns a less interest in the above described land than the en-
tire and undivided fee simple estate therein, then the bonus, royal-
ties and rentals herein provided for shall be paid lessor only in the
106. Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46, 82 A. L. R.
1264 (1931) ; accord, Goble v. Goff, 327 Mich. 549, 42 N. W. 2d 845 (1950).
107. See the discussion in Berry v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 188 F.
2d820 (5th Cir. 1951).
108. Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F. 2d 634 (5th Cir. 1932) ; see
Walker, Cases on Oil and Gas 813-814 (1949).
109. Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 249 S. W. 2d
914 (Tex. 1952).
110. See Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 450, 86 S. W. 2d
1077 (1935), 14 Texas L. Rev. 563 (1936) ; Griffin v. Stanolind Oil & Gas
Co., 133 Tex. 45, 125 S. W. 2d 545 (1939).
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proportion which his interest bears to the whole and undivided
fee,
'
"
11 1
Care should be exercised either to strike the word "rentals"
from the porportionate reduction clause when the lessor owns only
an undivided interest in the land or to increase proportionately the
amount provided for by the lease for delay rentals, so that after pro-
portionate reduction, the lessor will receive the rentals agreed upon
for his undivided interest. Thus, if the'lessor owns an undivided one-
half interest for which interest a 50 cent per acre delay rental is
bargained for, and if the lease purports to convey the entire fee
in the tract, either rentals should be deleted from the proportionate
reduction clause or the rental clause should provide for $1 per acre
iental. The former practice would seem preferable as payment of
a rental smaller than is provided for by the delay rental clause may
give rise to friction and litigation. This practice does, of course, de-
prive the lessor of the benefit of the proportionate reduction clause
as to rentals in the event the lessor owns a smaller interest than was
supposed.
The proportionate reduction clause should be carefully exam-
ined even if the lease purports to convey no more than the undivid-
interest believed to be owned by the lessor. This clause usually pro-
vides for a reduction in bonus, rentals and royalties if the lessor
owns less than the entire fee simple. Does this mean that these items
are to be proportionately reduced even if the lessor owns the undi-
vided interest purported to be conveyed? In a recent Texas case this
problem was raised." 2 The lease purported to convey only the undi-
vided Y interest owned by the lessor, but the proportionate reduc-
tion clause called for a reduction in bonus, rentals and royalties if
the lessor owned less than the entire fee simple "in said land." The
lessor paid only one-half of the full delay rentals specified in the
lease, claiming that by operation of the proportionate reduction
clause the lessor was entitled only to a ratable share of the rentals.
The lease was held to terminate on failure to pay the full delay ren-
tals required by the express terms of the lease.
The court concluded that when the "lessee agreed to pay $160
rental on said land, said land referred to the interest therein con-
veyed by the lessor, namely, lessor's undivided one-half interest.
* * * The property referred to as the land is the same as that actu-
ally owned and conveyed by the lessors. * * * Having determined
111. Reeves v. Republic Production Co., 177 S. W. 2d 1011 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944) (error ref'd, w.o.m).
112. Texas Co. v. Parks, 247 S. W. 2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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that the lessee agreed to pay lessor $160 annual delay rental for the
interest conveyed, it necessarily follows that appellant could not
rely upon the reduction clause to reduce the payment from $160 to
$80. The appellee's title has not failed. They owned the entire fee
simple in what they conveyed, to-wit, their undivided one-half in-
terest."21 8
This opinion dictates careful reconsideration of the language
appropriate for the proportionate reduction clause where the lease
purports to convey a lessor's undivided interest in the land. The
clause should be modified to provide for a reduction only if the
lessor owns less than the undivided interest conveyed by the grant-
ing clause of the lease.
RELATIONSHIP OF DELAY RENTAL CLAUSE AND COVENANTS
OF LESSEE
The relationship between the delay rental clause and the cove-
nants of the lease is also important. Acceptance of rentals under a
lease has been held to waive performance of the duties of the lessee
under express or implied covenants despite the presence in the lease
of a forfeiture clause. Thus in Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 14 a lessor
sought to obtain forfeiture of the lessee's interest for failure to deve-
lop the premises. The rule applicable to this type of case was said
to be "that the acceptance of delayed rental payment precludes the
lessor from forfeiting the lease for failure to develop during the
term covered by the delayed rental. In such a case the lessor still has
the gas and has received the reserved rent for the delay in drilling.
* * * The allegations of the bill mean that on September 9, 1950, a
payment was made by the lessee Sun and received by the complain-
ants of their part of the $200 [delay rentals] under said lease. That
circumstance, as heretofore stated, was a waiver of any default
which had existed up to that time, if there was any, and by express
terms in the lease extended the right of the lessee for another twelve
months within which to perform its duty which arose under the
contract, whether expressed or implied. Within twelve months
after September 9, 1950, and on the 2d day of July, 1951, this bill
was filed. So that at the time the bill was filed the lessee Sun was not
in such default under the terms of the contract as to justify a for-
feiture thereof and that without regard to whether it had failed up
to that time to comply with the same." ' If the lessor is to have an
action for breach of the covenants of a lease during the primary
113. Id. at 182.
114. 258 Ala. 326, 62 So. 2d 783 (1953).
115. Id. at 335, 62 So. 2d at 790-791.
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term, he must reject tender of delay rentals and instead give notice
of the breach and demand for performance of the lessee's cove-
nants.
The weight of authority seems to be in accord with this decision
that the acceptance of delay rentals excuses performance by the
lessee of his covenants, express or implied, as regards protection
against drainage or engaging in drilling operations. Clearly if the
lessor refuses a tender of rentals he may thereafter pursue his nor-
mally available remedies for the lessee's failure to develop the pre-
mises or to protect the premises from drainage. 16 In some cases it
is said that the lessor must advise the lessee of the drainage, inform
him that no further rentals will be accepted, and make a demand for
the commencement of drilling operations. No cause of action arises
during the period for which delay rentals had been paid if they are
paid after notice to the lessor,1 7 or unless notice of breach of the
covenant was given to the lessee and demand made for perform-
ance.l" ' However, the lessee cannot successfully contend that the
refusal of the tendered rental and demand for a protection well will
terminate the lease and relieve him from liability for drainage. 19
In Louisiana a distinction is drawn between express and implied
covenants. Acceptance of rentals with knowledge of a breach of
an implied covenant is said to operate as a waiver of any right of
action either for damages or for forfeiture, but where there is an
express covenant to drill an offset well, the acceptance of rentals will
not constitute a waiver of the rights of the lessor under the cove-
nant.-
0
In Texas, however, it has been held that acceptance of delay
rentals with knowledge of existing substantial drainage is not a
116. Poindexter v. Lion Oil Ref. Co., 205 Ark. 978, 167 S. W. 2d 492(1943) (conditional decree of cancellation ordered) ; Deep Rock Oil Corp.
v. Bilby, 199 Okla. 430, 186 P. 2d 823 (1947).
117. Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F. 2d 59 (10th Cir. 1930) ("It is our
conclusion that a lessor who accepts delay rentals, before necessity for offset
drilling has arisen or without knowledge of such necessity, does not waive
a breach of the implied covenant to drill off-set wells; but a lessor who
accepts delay rentals, after the necessity for such off-set drilling has arisen
and is known to him, waives the performance of the implied covenant to drill
off-set wells during the period for which such delay rentals are accepted." Id.
at 63) ; Lindow v. Southern Carbon Co., 5 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. La. 1932) ;
Carson v. Ozark Nat. Gas Co., 191 Ark. 167, 83 S. W. 2d 833 (1935) ; Clear
Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160 Ark. 574, 255 S. W. 7 (1923) ; Carter
Oil Co. v. Samuels, 181 Okla. 218, 73 P. 2d 453 (1937) ; Carper v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12, L. R. A. 1917A 171 (1916).
118. Rowe v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 240 S. W. 2d 61 (Ky. 1951).
119. Arkansas Nat. Gas Corp. v. Pierson, 84 F. 2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936).
120. Hood v. Southern Production Co., 206 La. 642, 19 So. 2d 336(1944) ; accord, Stanley v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 793, 90 S. E.
344 (1916).
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waiver of the implied covenant to drill a protection well during
the period of delay in the commencement of a well covered by the
rental period.121 This position has also been taken by the Supreme
Court of Mississippi. In the Millette case 22 the court implied a
covenant by the lessee to conserve the interests of its lessors by pro-
tecting against or compensating for the lessee's own act of drain-
age from adjacent premises. It then held "that the acceptance of the
delay rentals in May 1949 does not per se estop the appellants to
claim damage by way of waste caused by provable drainage through
the affirmative action of their lessee. By repetition, we emphasize
that the option to defer actual drilling by the payment of annual
delay rentals affects only the specific right which such rentals are
designed to purchase. Aceptance of such rentals is relevant solely
to the duty to drill; they are not compensation for waste or deple-
tion. Under this form of lease, the lessor may drill wells or pay
rentals, but on the other hand he must prevent drainage or pay
damages.1"123
PERORATION
The importance of care in the drafting of an oil and gas lease
is obvious. Not merely is it important that care be exercised in
drafting the individual clauses of the lease which have been the con-
cern of this paper, but it is vital that the relationship inter sese of
the several clauses of a lease be carefully analyzed. A lessor which
in recent years has executed leases on very substantial tracts in a
producing state decided a little more than a year ago to prohibit
assignments by the lessee without the lessor's consent, and it added
a new printed term to the lease form which it used, providing that
"This lease shall be assignable only on written consent of the les-
sor." Entirely apart from the serious question of the validity of
such restraint on the alienation of the fee interest of the lessee, the
propriety of the employment of this clause is made even more doubt-
ful by the fact that an earlier clause of the form, left unchanged in
this revision, provides that "If the estate of either party hereto is
assigned - and the privilege of assigning in whole or in part is ex-
pressly allowed - * *.,,24 This form is still being used. Surely
it is timely for interested parties carefully to read and analyze the
lease forms in use.
121. Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S. W. 2d 872 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
122. Millette v. Phillips Pet. Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950).
123. Id. at 706, 48 So. 2d at 348-349.
124. Inevitably this lease form is labelled "Producers 88". Are there
any "unless" lease forms in use which are not so labelled?
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